Saturday, 11 December 2010

25 sene, buyuk kazanclar ve kayiplar: IMKB ve bireysel yerli yatirimcilar

IMKB Aralik 1985 yilinda acildi. Acilisin modu Ankaradaki politikacilarin finansal serbestlige yonelik bir sembolik hareket daha yapma konusundaki kararliliklari sebebiyle biraz tepeden inme ve sallapati oldu. Hisse senedi sahipligi Istanbuldaki araci kurumlarin ve bagimsiz hisse simsarlarinin kurdugu tezgah ustu piyasaya ragmen topluma mal olmus bir yatirim sekli degildi. Aslinda su ana kadar boyle bir duruma gelmeyi de basaramadi. Pisayada yabancilar diye bilinen ve 1989'dan beri IMKB'ye yatirim yapan uluslararasi kurumsal yatirimcilar son 5 6 senede IMKB’nin piyasa degerinin yuzde 60 ve daha fazlasini ele gecirdiler.

Competition and Change Aralık 2010 sayisinda yayinladigim makalede IMKB’nin tarihini 1985’e kadar getirip yerli bireysel yatirimci karakterinin son 25 senede yasadigi degisimleri tartisiyorum. Bu tartismanin amaci yerli bireysel tasarruf sahiplerinin borsa yatirimina neden soguk baktigina bir cevap bulabilmek. Bunu yaparken 25 senelik tarihi IMKB’nin yasadigi iki kuresellesme dalgasina boluyorum. Birinci dalga acilistan 2001 krizine kadar olan, yuksek faiz yuksek enflasyon ve Erturk (2003)’ un kupon kapitalism diye adlandirdigi donem. Ikinci donem ise 2001 krizi sonrasi yapisal reformlarin meyvesini verdigi ve Turkiye’nin “yapisal saglikli” ekonomi donemine gecisinin devam ettigi donem. Bu donemleri islerken bireysel yerli yatirimcilarin nasil bir macro ve micro piyasa kosullarinda yatirim yapmayi ogrendigini gostermeye calisiyorum. Bunu yaptiktan sonra yerli bireysel yatirimcilara hizmet veren dort araci kurumdan piyasalari anlamlandirma ve yatirim kararlari alma faaliyetleri uzerine deliller sunuyorum. Araci kurumlarla ile ilgili bolum 2008 ve 2009’dan, yani buyuk cokus ve toparlanma doneminden geliyor. Makalenin IMKB’nin 25. yili kutlamalarina denk gelmesi benim icin hos bir tesaduf oldu.

Makalemde piyasa sosyoloji bakimindan temel argumanim su: Piyasalar rekabetin ve catismalarin yasandigi cok-yuzlu kurumlar. Piyasalari modern finans teorisinde savunuldugu gibi rasyonel, isbirlikci ve cogu iyi niyetli insanlarin toplamindan olusan seyler olarak goremeyiz. Eger kanun koyucular ve uygulayacilar piyasalari ikinci sekilde gormekte israr eder ve daha zayif olan gruplarin guveni kazanmakta basarisiz olur, onlari firsatci araci kurumlarin, sirket sahiplerinin, bireysel spekulatorlerin eline birakirsa, zayif gruplarin taklit yoluyla bu gruplar gibi firsatci ve kisa vadeci olmalari sasirtici olmasa gerek. Tabi bunun daha kotu bir sonucu da bireysel yatirimcilarin piyasaya yatirdiklari servetleri kaybetmeleri ve piyasan bir daha geri donmemek uzere ayrilmalari. Ne yazik ki 1990li yillarda bu olumsuz durum bircok bireysel yatirimci icin gercek oldu. Fakat bu uzucu gerceklikte daha fazla onemli olan sebep ulkeyi yuksek enflasyon ve butce aciklariyla yoneten populist politikacilardi.

2000 sonrasi Turk ekonomisinin, siyasetinin ve ona paralel olarak araci kurum sektorunun yasadigi buyuk bir degisim var. Bu degisim bir bakima kuresel finans sermayesinin tesvikiyle gerceklesti. Bu degisime ragmen bireysel yatirimcilar borsa yatirimlarinda hala firsatci ve kisa vadeli bir bakis acisina sahipler. Buradaki en onemli degisim ise bireysel yatirimcinin artik piyasalar hakkinda daha bilgili olmasi. Bunda kuresel ve Turkiye piyasalarinda yasanan dijital devrimin de buyuk payi var. SPK’nin ve IMKB’nin son bir kac senede yaptigi piyasa reformlari, ve bireysel yatirimcilar arasinda egitim ve guven kazanma kampanyalari sayesinde belki IMKB’nin 50 yilinda bambaska bir piyasa ile yasayacagiz.


Makalenin ingilizce ozeti asagidaki adresten gorunebilir
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/maney/com/2010/00000014/F0020003/art00011

Not: Bu calismada bana yardimci olan, zamanlarini benle paylasan Istanbuldaki tum piyasa calisanlarina ve yatirimcilara tesekkurler. Bu makale onlara adanmistir!

Wednesday, 8 December 2010

A Quarter century of learning by great rewards and losses-Turkish retail investors in the Istanbul Stock Exchange

The ISE was opened in December 1985 in a rather haphazard manner with the command of the politicians in Ankara to make yet another token for their policy of financial deregulation. Although there was an OTC market in Istanbul populated by banks and independent brokers, share ownership was not a mass population phenomenon. In fact, so far it has never managed to become so. Foreign institutional investors known as "foreigners" in market parlance, have bought up more than 60 per cent of the portfolio value in the market in recent years.

In my new article, which is published in Competition and Change December 2010 issue, I trace the ISE's history back to 1985 and discuss the evolution of the Domestic Retail Investor figure over two and a half decades to find an answer to why Turkish household savers are not very enthusiastic about stock market investment. I then present evidence on the sense-making and investment activities from four brokerage houses which serve retail investors. The evidence is from 2008 and 2009, the crush and the recovery years of global financial markets. It is also a nice coincidence that this article is published when the ISE is celebrating its 25th year in operation.

My argument in the article is simply this, markets are multifaceted institutions of competition and conflict and they are not the aggregate of rational, cooperative and nice individuals as it seems to be espoused in modern finance theory. If one ignores this aspect and fails to win the trust of less powerful groups (domestic retail investor in the case of the ISE) and leaves them in the hands of opportunistic intermediaries, company owners, self-made domestic speculators and so on, then it is not surprising that retail investors in the ISE evolve into opportunistic and short-termist participants in the market or worse lose their fortunes and leave the market for good. This was unfortunately the case in the 1990s for many domestic retail investors in the ISE. But a more powerful factor in this evolution was the populist politicians of the 1990s who ran the Turkish economy on high budget deficits and high inflation in order to finance their unsustainable populist policies. Despite the great transformation in brokerage sector and the Turkish economy and politics in the new millennium, both if which were partially sanctioned by the global finance capital, the retail investor figure is still short-termist and opportunistic, like they used to be in the 1990s, but with a more informed perception frame about the markets thanks to the digital revolution in the global and Turkish financial markets. Maybe with more public campaigns and micro-market reforms for education and trust building among retail investors as it is now done by the ISE and the Capital Markets Board, we will have a totally new ISE in its half centenary in 2035!

article's abstract available here
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/maney/com/2010/00000014/F0020003/art00011

PS: Many thanks to all my informants in Istanbul. This article is dedicated to them.